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I. Introduction
Convicted sex offenders in the United States are subject 
to a wide variety of requirements upon their conviction 
or release, including registration with local authorities, 
community notification, and residency and employment 
restrictions, among others. Ostensibly, these sex 
offender post-release laws are intended not to punish, 
but to regulate or control the behavior of previously con-
victed sex offenders in hopes of reducing recidivism.1 
Designing post-release laws, of course, requires making 
assumptions about sex offenders and the genesis of their 
criminal behavior.2 Yet lawmakers often apply these 
laws across the board in a knee-jerk way to anyone con-
victed of any crime that happens to be termed a “sex 
offense,” with little regard to whether the assumptions 
underlying post-release laws are equally well suited to 
the nature of each and every triggering offense and cov-
ered offender.3
Many commentators and researchers have criticized 
the general application of post-release laws to all sex offend-
ers as draconian, costly, anti-rehabilitative, and ultimately 
unlikely to reduce the frequency of sex offenses.4 Recent 
work even raises the possibility that post-release laws may 
increase sex offender recidivism by making life outside of 
prison so unpleasant that the threat of returning an 
offender to prison no longer provides much of a deter-
rent.5 Unfortunately, additional unintended and 
unfavorable consequences may develop when the prem-
ises of a post-release law are sharply at odds with the 
reality of how offenders commit one or more of the sex 
offenses covered by the law. Under certain conditions, in 
fact, applying a post-release law to the wrong kinds of sex 
offenders may not only increase their likelihood of reoff-
ending but also induce other potential offenders to engage 
in the targeted criminal activity.
Just such a mismatch occurs in the application of com-
munity notification laws to individuals convicted of 
possessing and distributing child pornography. The mis-
alignment of notification laws and the possession and 
distribution of child pornography runs alongside the 
related controversies raging over the nature of child por-
nography crimes, the threat or threats posed by child 
pornography offenders, and the extent to which child por-
nography offenders ought to be punished.6 The U.S. 
Sentencing Commission and the courts struggle with how 
to sentence possessors and distributors of child pornogra-
phy because there is disagreement over the harm these 
individuals may cause to potential victims in the future.7 
But all should agree that if community notification 
requirements actually facilitate the possession, distribu-
tion, and even production of child pornography, the 
decision to impose these requirements should be recon-
sidered. Furthermore, if community notification laws may 
actually enable the commission of crime, judges should be 
wary of relying on their application to offenders as a substi-
tute for incarceration.
II. the Power of the Phrase Sex Offense
Under state and federal law, all child pornography crimes 
qualify as sex offenses, meaning that anyone convicted of 
possessing, distributing, or producing child pornography 
is legally designated a sex offender and must comply with a 
range of sex offender post-release laws.8 Community noti-
fication laws, arguably the most important of these 
post-release regulations, require that states and the federal 
government make a covered sex offender’s identity and 
criminal history easily available to the public,9 often via 
the well-known and controversial Web registries that now 
exist in every state and at the federal level.10 Consequently, 
once released from incarceration, child pornography 
offenders become publicly known criminals.
Are child pornography offenses appropriately charac-
terized as sex offenses? Despite its incredible social, 
cultural, and political power, the phrase sex offense lacks 
any precise (or even meaningful) definition. Ask someone 
to describe a sex offense and you are likely to receive at 
best a list of qualifying crimes (e.g., forcible rape, child 
molestation, indecent exposure, peeping into a dwelling, 
etc.) rather than a list of required properties or a “precise 
statement of the essential nature of a thing.”11 Accord-
ingly, the term sex offense may be more profitably 
interpreted as a label or as a category grouping crimes 
together, presumably for similar treatment or for some 
other functional purpose. 
To be sure, the array of crimes designated sex offenses 
do appear to be related to each other: The public generally 
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views those who commit these crimes as especially (and 
viscerally) repugnant.12 Sex offenders are sometimes con-
sidered evil and oftentimes considered dangerous, but 
they are uniformly perceived as “creepy,” “weird,” and 
“gross,” unknowable and unpredictable.13 Law-abiding citi-
zens may be able to relate to a thief’s rationale for stealing 
and may find many types of violence at least understand-
able, if still inexcusable. Sex offenses, however, are often a 
world apart. Consequently, a legislature might label a 
crime a sex offense to make plain the public’s inability to 
comprehend the reasons for, or the preferences underly-
ing, an offender’s actions, as well as to ratify the public’s 
deep fear and revulsion.14
The various crimes described as sex offenses there-
fore do share important attributes that seem legally 
relevant in justice systems that take into account “the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 
and characteristics of the defendant.”15 However, once a 
collection of crimes are gathered together for one pur-
pose or because they share certain qualities, they may 
remain perpetually fused for every purpose.16 Lawmakers, 
judges, and the general public may regard the varied 
crimes described as sex offenses as not simply possess-
ing one or two important similarities, but as having 
parallel elements and harms and as involving the same 
set of offenders.17 For example, many people simply 
assume that individuals who possess child pornography 
are also highly likely to be child sex abusers. Yet, as one 
commentator has noted, individuals who watch violent 
movies are not similarly presumed by the average person 
to be violent aggressors.18
One feature of this general grouping phenomenon is 
that society comes to view all sex offenses and sex offend-
ers through the lens of one or two orthodox or archetypal 
crimes that serve as reference offenses.19 For sex offenses, 
forcible rape and child molestation by a stranger, not sur-
prisingly, have come to play this role because they are 
salient, culturally recognizable, and especially alarm-
ing.20 Once all crimes in the sex offense category were 
transformed into the crimes of violent rapists and child 
molesters, at least in the minds of the public and law-
makers,21 it should come as no surprise that legislatures 
began to target all sex offenses with one-size-fits-all poli-
cies. The significant increase in the severity of child 
pornography sanctions over the last thirty years (as child 
pornography possessors and distributors became synony-
mous with rapists and child molesters) appears to fit this 
model. 
Under normal circumstances, generic or blanket rules 
are likely to be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, 
and therefore frequently wasteful, unfair, and ineffective. 
But, as the remainder of this article will make clear, the 
generic application of community notification laws to indi-
viduals convicted of possessing or distributing child 
pornography creates a significant additional risk of both 
facilitating recidivism and increasing the frequency of 
child pornography offenses even among those not subject 
to notification, including the incidence of abuse associated 
with the production of child pornography.
III. the theory Behind community Notification Laws
Community notification seeks to reduce sex offender 
recidivism by empowering and deputizing the public, giv-
ing citizens tools to prevent crime in some cases and to 
speed capture in others. These tools are pieces of informa-
tion (e.g., offenders’ names, addresses, identifying 
information, and criminal histories), seemingly inexpen-
sive and innocuous by nature and made more powerful 
and easier to use by their availability on the Internet and 
the addition of search algorithms keyed to the questions 
potential victims are most likely to ask (e.g., “Do any sex 
offenders live near me?”). In theory, individuals at risk of 
being victimized will protect themselves from potential 
threats. Once informed that a sex offender lives nearby, 
for example, neighbors can avoid getting too close at the 
wrong time, can alter their lifestyles to reduce their 
chances of becoming victims, and can help others, too, by 
keeping eyes out for strange behavior or unsafe circum-
stances or conditions that might lead to an attack.
Lawmakers build their case for community notification 
laws on a very specific understanding of who sex offenders 
are and what will drive their future behavior. Sex offenders 
are taken to be impulsive predators who attack victims in 
their vicinity when the opportunity arises.22 These individ-
uals are rarely seen as motivated by financial need or 
greed. They do not commit crimes for money. Instead, 
they are driven by illicit, deep-seated (even innate) prefer-
ences or passions.23 Lawmakers even assume that, at least 
for some of these sex offenders, no threatened sanction 
will suffice to deter their future crimes.24
The drafters of community notification laws were also 
clearly preoccupied with a particular type of violent or forc-
ible sex offense. These are crimes against individual 
victims—victims who are strangers, but who potential 
offenders know can be found at the mall, in a parking lot, 
down the street, or at a park.25 Lawmakers implicitly 
assume that sex offenders require no map to find these 
victims. No clutch of tools or band of accomplices, no 
instruction or study, just a predatory instinct, is needed to 
carry out these crimes. Finally, because these offenses 
require no preparation or contact with others, the “who,” 
“when,” and “where” of any incident are nearly impossible 
to predict and, therefore, seemingly random.
When sex offender recidivism consists of crimes that 
are violent, impulsive, and unpredictable, a policy that 
alerts possible victims to steer clear of released offenders 
and that asks the public to monitor these potential recidi-
vists seems sensible. In fact, community notification laws 
are often named after victims of just these sorts of crimes. 
Megan Kanka,26 for example, may have been spared had 
her parents known of her attacker’s criminal history of 
sexual violence. But does it make sense to apply commu-
nity notification laws to individuals convicted not of rape 
and murder, but of possessing or distributing child 
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pornography? Even if in the child pornography context the 
critical assumptions of such laws do not hold? “It can’t 
hurt” may be the first reaction to these questions. Unfor-
tunately, under certain conditions, publicizing the 
identities of child pornography offenders may do more 
harm than good.27
IV.  typical child Pornography offenders Differ from 
Archetypal sex criminals
Community notification laws may lead to higher rates of 
recidivism among individuals convicted of child pornogra-
phy offenses and may also grow the market for child 
pornography—expanding the total quantity being pro-
duced, distributed, and possessed. To see why there ought 
to be concern, consider these questions and note how dif-
ferent they are from the sorts of questions that might be 
asked about archetypal sex offenses (and how much closer 
they are to questions that might be asked about drug 
offenses): How does someone interested in producing and 
distributing child pornography find a buyer? How do 
potential buyers find distributors without triggering 
alarms? How do child pornography rings form? How does 
someone who is curious about child pornography find out 
more? Whom does one ask, whom can one trust? Are 
there ways to avoid detection when committing child por-
nography offenses? How does one learn these tricks of the 
trade? How is it possible that a multibillion-dollar Internet 
industry has emerged among individuals who are commit-
ting serious crimes and yet are, essentially, unknown to 
each other and therefore untrustworthy?
Most child pornography offenses depend crucially on 
the existence of a relatively well-functioning marketplace 
for selling, purchasing, and trading child pornography.28 
Absent that market, the child pornography problem looks 
very different. The vast bulk of child pornography offenses 
cannot occur without an offender’s involvement with 
another person (e.g., a producer or distributor) in some 
way, and so either trust or leverage of some sort is essen-
tial to an individual’s ability or willingness to commit an 
offense.29 As in any setting involving other people and 
rapidly changing technology, successfully producing, dis-
tributing, or receiving child pornography (and evading 
arrest) is easier the more one knows about the market, its 
participants, and the constraints the law prescribes.30 
Child pornography offenders are more likely to avoid 
detection the more they understand about the child por-
nography industry and enforcement tactics.31
The key question, therefore, is whether publicly identify-
ing child pornography distributors and possessors is likely 
to interfere with or facilitate the functioning of the child 
pornography market. With the exception of producers, 
who often commit other sex offenses,32 the mismatch 
analysis in the parts above suggests that there may be sig-
nificant negative consequences on balance from publicly 
identifying child pornography offenders.
Consider the three principal types of child pornography 
offenses—possession, distribution, and production—and 
the types of offenders who commit these offenses and the 
harms (or hypothesized harms) that each offense creates. 
Under federal law, possession, distribution, and production 
are distinct offenses, but in practice they are intimately con-
nected in many important ways. Some individuals might 
produce and consume their own pornography,33 having 
developed their interest and criminal human capital in child 
pornography absent any significant external aid or influ-
ence. But many of each type of offender need or at least 
benefit from the existence of other child pornography 
offenders of all types, and would commit less crime were 
they cut off entirely from these individuals.
Many of the harms that emanate from possession (or, 
really, from consumption and the risk of future consump-
tion of caches of pictures or films) ultimately derive from 
the fact that producers produce and distributors distribute. 
Without these earlier links in the chain, much less posses-
sion and much less consumption would occur. Only 
would-be possessors willing and able to become their own 
producers would remain in a position to consume.
This observation is certainly not new. In fact, the hope of 
eliminating producers and distributors is at least one of the 
reasons why the production and distribution of child por-
nography are punished more severely than possession.34 By 
making the production and distribution of child pornogra-
phy more costly in terms of expected criminal sanctions, 
lawmakers supposedly can reduce the interest in and there-
fore the volume of production and distribution.35 But if 
reducing interest in producing and distributing is the goal, 
law can do even more by reducing the financial profitability 
(and by increasing the likelihood of detection) of producing 
and distributing child pornography. If not carefully 
designed and executed, law might also unwittingly do the 
opposite, expanding the market by making the production 
and distribution of child pornography more profitable and 
less risky than it would otherwise be.
Now imagine that the vast majority of consumers who 
are willing to pay for child pornography could be elimi-
nated. Or, alternatively, imagine either that many of these 
consumers could be rendered risky prospects in that they 
might be naïve criminals who are likely to attract atten-
tion, or that these consumers could be transformed into 
only potential consumers who need to be convinced to 
enter or reenter the market for child pornography. The 
elimination of consumers would eradicate most child por-
nography, zeroing out the harms caused by possession 
and distribution. Production might still occur, but there 
would be much less of it—not because expected criminal 
sanctions had increased, but because production would 
yield many fewer benefits. Furthermore, any remaining 
production would be hard to distinguish from traditional 
sex offenses unrelated to the creation of pictures or films, 
including child sex abuse involving contact and often 
violence.
This argument is not new, either. Scaring away the 
customers is one of the reasons society criminalizes pos-
session and sentences possessors severely.36 Many doubt 
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that consuming child pornography can cause someone to 
attack a child.37 Others are skeptical of the idea that each 
viewing of a piece of child pornography constitutes a sig-
nificant new harm to the children involved.38 Yet few 
dispute the claims that producing child pornography 
involves child sex abuse and that one (perhaps costly) 
strategy to reduce abuse is to increase the penalties and 
stiffen the enforcement of laws criminalizing the posses-
sion of child pornography.
But is raising the expected criminal sanction the only 
way to reduce demand for child pornography? If law is 
able to isolate child pornography producers, distributors, 
and consumers from each other, for example, it might 
raise the transactions costs of trading or selling pornogra-
phy by making it difficult for child pornography offenders 
to find each other.39 Alternatively, if law can create uncer-
tainty as to the identity, reliability, and experience of 
individuals seeking entry or greater involvement in the 
child pornography market, the greater likelihood of detec-
tion that results, even if slight, might make the effort no 
longer worth the candle.40
The law currently tackles all child pornography crimes 
by raising the expected level of criminal sanctions—and, 
therefore, the costs—of criminal behavior. The law accom-
plishes this less by increasing the probability of 
detection,41 and more by increasing the penalty for some-
one who is caught and convicted. But, as the previous 
discussion shows, the calculus of the child pornography 
offender is more complicated,42 closely approximating, in 
many ways, the calculus of individuals involved in the ille-
gal drug trade. A decision to engage in criminal behavior 
turns on (1) the benefits of committing the crime, (2) the 
costs (in time, effort, and money) of committing the 
crime, (3) the probability of being detected or caught, and 
(4) the criminal sanctions facing an individual who is 
caught. The law currently focuses on (3) and (4) in seeking 
to make child pornography crimes unattractive, but it 
would be unwise to ignore the possibly unintended effects 
that sex offender policies may have on (1) and (2).43
V.  Attacking child Pornography by Keeping some 
offenders Anonymous
Markets, even illegal markets, need information to func-
tion well, and the purpose of community notification laws 
is to provide information. All individuals convicted of 
child pornography offenses will, upon release, have their 
identifying information, addresses, and the nature of their 
offenses made public. If potential possessors, distributors, 
and producers do indeed weigh the net benefits of their 
participation in the child pornography market, the same 
rubric can be used to consider the likely effects of notifica-
tion laws on recidivism and the total size of the child 
pornography market (i.e., the frequency of all child por-
nography crimes).
First, consider possession offenses, the most contro-
versial of the child pornography crimes. Take an 
individual with no criminal record who is interested in 
learning more about child pornography.44 He would like 
to explore it on the Internet, but he is uncertain about how 
to avoid detection and knows too little about child pornog-
raphy, including whether he would enjoy it—or enjoy it 
enough—to make it worthwhile to proceed. (Compare the 
very similar situation of a person interested in trying an 
illegal drug.) In effect, the transactions costs of figuring 
out how to enter the child pornography market are simply 
too high. In one sense, costs are high because child por-
nography is illegal and immoral, so active and obvious 
hunting for child pornography or asking friends for advice 
may be viewed as too risky and too costly in time and 
effort. But, in another sense, costs are high because there 
is no easy alternative source of information, unless the 
interested individual happens to know someone involved 
in child pornography. 
The application of notification laws to child pornogra-
phy offenders can help fill these information gaps for this 
imagined potential consumer in a few ways. First, 
bizarrely, Web registries may essentially provide a contact 
list for individuals who wish to learn more about child 
pornography. Second, and more worryingly, a Web regis-
try offers a shortlist of individuals potentially willing and 
able to supply child pornography directly and perhaps in 
person, a concern that may become more important if law 
enforcement succeeds in its attempts to render the Internet 
hostile to child pornography transactions. Counterintui-
tively, therefore, subjecting child pornography offenders 
to community notification requirements may enable rather 
than obstruct the growth and development of the illegal 
child pornography market.
An implicit but crucial assumption underlying any 
notification strategy is that members of the public will not 
use a Web registry to contact and conspire with individu-
als who have a verifiable (indeed, verified) history of 
engaging in a particular type of crime. In the cases of low-
risk possessors and distributors of child pornography (as 
opposed to those individual possessors or distributors who 
appear more likely to commit child molestation and pro-
ducers who, as a class, seem much more likely to take part 
in child sex abuse again), the benefits of enhancing the 
public’s ability to avoid and monitor these individuals 
(from afar) may pale in comparison to the increase, say, in 
child sex abuse that results from the conspiracy-driven 
growth in demand for child pornography as people use the 
registry to network.
Notification laws may also increase the likelihood that 
convicted possessors and distributors return to their old 
ways of consuming, trading, buying, and selling child por-
nography. Abstracting away from other complaints about 
community notification’s likely effects on recidivism,45 
picture the thought process of a recently convicted child 
pornography consumer who wants to consume again. 
Caught once, he is likely to hesitate, unless he can become 
a better criminal by being more careful (otherwise, the cost 
of returning to child pornography possession might be too 
high). If he needs advice, unfortunately, the expertise of a 
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community of released child pornography offenders—
bound together forever by their shared sex offender 
label—awaits him on the nearest Web registry. Simply 
their stories of how they were caught would be useful to 
someone looking to reoffend.46 But, should he desire their 
advice or assistance, his conviction and its verifiability may 
well earn their trust.47
Second, consider distribution and production offenses. 
If producers or distributors are to make a financial profit 
or otherwise benefit from selling or trading child pornog-
raphy, customers and trading partners are necessary. The 
greater the total demand for child pornography, the larger 
the potential profits or benefits for producers and distribu-
tors, and the more likely that individuals considering 
taking on these roles will enter the market by photograph-
ing or filming child sex abuse or by building another 
distribution node that adds value or reduces costs, leading 
to more total consumption.48
The scale of the child pornography market is clearly 
enormous.49 How producers (or distributors) establish 
themselves and gain the trust of other participants in this 
illegal market is, strangely, much less clear.50 Nor is it 
clear what role, if any, community notification plays in 
that process. For reasons already discussed, public lists 
that identify those individuals previously convicted of 
child pornography offenses may be useful to someone 
producing or distributing child pornography: the individu-
als listed are potential partners (i.e., co-conspirators) who 
can provide advice and access to existing networks. But 
notification regimes that make public the identities of con-
victed child pornography possessors may also provide lists 
of potential customers, the use of which may reduce the 
per-person cost of advertising and recruiting, thereby 
increasing the profitability of the enterprise by expanding 
the customer base. 
* * *
There are many potential objections to the contention 
that applying community notification requirements to child 
pornography possessors and distributors may increase 
rather than reduce the total harm flowing from child por-
nography. One important response is that individuals who 
possess (and so also those who distribute and produce) 
child pornography are either more likely to commit a child 
sex crime involving physical contact as a result of consum-
ing child pornography or are already engaging in such 
crime undetected.51 Notification succeeds, the argument 
runs, because it encourages at-risk children to steer clear of 
(and their parents to monitor) these individuals. 
But even if the claims supporting this objection are 
true, a big if,52 and even if notification is actually helpful at 
reducing recidivism in this context, another big if,53 an 
empirical question still remains about the net benefits of 
community notification. For notification to make sense, 
the reductions, if any, in child sex crime that result from 
neighbors avoiding and monitoring child pornography 
offenders would need to more than offset the effects of a 
possibly larger and more robust child pornography mar-
ket, including the increase in child sex abuse that may 
occur to satisfy any additional demand.54
A more direct challenge to this article’s thesis would 
target the practical likelihood that community notifica-
tion does or can, in fact, facilitate child pornography 
networks. Is there any evidence that people do or might 
use Web registries in ways that cause harm? Admittedly, 
attempts to locate evidence of any specific, verifiable 
instance in which child pornography offenders clearly 
used or benefited (in a direct or indirect way) from the 
identifying information contained in America’s ubiqui-
tous sex offender Web registries have so far proven 
fruitless. Nevertheless, circumstantial evidence demon-
strates that lawmakers ought to be skeptical of the simple 
inferences that result from their equating child pornog-
raphy possessors and distributors with archetypal sex 
offenders.
Community notification laws do more than simply 
reveal an individual’s criminal history to potential victims 
(or even potential accomplices or co-conspirators): They 
create groups. “[G]roups cultivate a special social identity . . . 
[that] often encourages risky behavior, leads individuals to 
behave against their self-interest, solidifies loyalty, and 
facilitates harm against nonmembers.”55 Child pornogra-
phy offenders will typically have many interests and 
experiences in common, but their shared public identity 
may cause these offenders to trust one another more than 
they otherwise might. Many relational models of trust sup-
port this prediction, but two seem particularly important: 
“category-based trust,” which forms on the basis of a per-
son’s “membership in a social or organizational category,” 
and “role-based trust,” which grows out of a group’s “com-
mon knowledge regarding the barriers to entry” faced by 
someone in a particular role.56 Were child pornography 
offenders to vary widely in their backgrounds, even arbi-
trary social divisions (such as sex offender status) would 
still create fierce intra-group loyalty, with group members 
more likely to believe and agree with other group mem-
bers than nongroup members, and to listen to them for 
longer periods of time.57 Furthermore, if child pornogra-
phy offenders are able to interact with each other, they will 
be able to build additional trust through small acts of 
cooperation,58 perhaps in the form of giving advice and 
support unrelated to child pornography.
Child pornography offenders do indeed interact when 
they discover each other in the world.59 Individuals who 
commit child pornography crimes connect with others in 
public and private peer-to-peer networks to trade images.60 
They e-mail each other and chat with one another,61 
announcing previous offenses as proof of trustworthi-
ness.62 Experts in abuse prevention worry about the fact 
that the Internet, an “enabling tool,” allows child pornog-
raphy enthusiasts to “find like-minded individuals,” 
“validat[ing] their ideas and thoughts.”63 Many offenders 
are convinced to experiment with child pornography 
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through advertisements or invitations they receive by 
e-mail,64 and pornography marketing in general is 
“aggressive.”65 Moreover, in-person interactions are not 
uncommon.66 Offenders are often introduced to child por-
nography by more seasoned offenders,67 and many derive 
satisfaction (sometimes sexual) from these conversations.68 
The public identification of child pornography offenders 
is likely to exacerbate the extent and consequences of these 
interactions, especially going forward. As technology 
evolves to allow better law enforcement monitoring of the 
Internet, potential offenders will presumably find it increas-
ingly difficult to establish, expand, or locate child 
pornography networks without some means of identifying 
individuals with similar inclinations or experiences. Web 
registry data may provide the key, because offender listings 
“expressly indicate, or can be used to help establish, an indi-
vidual’s proclivities—including sexual interest in 
children.”69 Furthermore, when individuals do make con-
tact, forming or expanding a child pornography conspiracy 
will be more likely to occur when one or more offenders can 
supply high-quality credentials,70 such as a public child por-
nography record—one that includes pictures of the 
offender, his home address, and other details that can be 
verified.71 Moreover, advertisements or invitations targeted 
at individuals known to have been involved with child por-
nography in the past are more likely to be effective in terms 
of their yield and their safety relative to e-mail spam, a tactic 
sure to rouse law enforcement attention. Face-to-face inter-
actions—and sharing of child pornography—may become 
more common in the future: as the detection of offenses 
becomes easier on the Internet, public lists of potential 
child pornography sources, customers, and partners will 
allow offenders to move off the grid and yet remain con-
nected outside of an anonymous internet chat room to 
others who share their criminal ambitions.
Notification laws may also lead to smarter, more suc-
cessful criminals. Child pornography offenders vary in 
their sophistication, but experienced offenders do counsel 
the inexperienced, suggesting that veterans are willing to 
supply guidance to interested newcomers.72 Although con-
cern about criminals learning from each other is nothing 
new, recent empirical work hints that notification laws 
may enable child pornography offenders to form networks 
and exchange information more easily. Patrick Bayer, 
Randi Hjalmarsson, and David Pozen have found that 
offenders are more likely to recidivate when they are 
imprisoned with offenders convicted of similar offenses.73 
Of greater significance, they have shown that these peer 
effects are even stronger in nonresidential facilities for 
crimes “largely dependent on access to networks,” because 
“nonresidential facilities may inadvertently increase the 
formation and expansion of criminal networks by bringing 
together young offenders from surrounding neighbor-
hoods.”74 The successful commission of child pornography 
offenses depends undeniably on access to networks, and, in 
many ways, publicly listed sex offenders—still connected to 
other offenders through shared social status and the 
weighty post-release restrictions they experience—have 
much in common with offenders who find it easier to 
identify and collaborate with other criminals when sen-
tenced to a nonresidential facility.
VI. conclusion and Next steps
The use of community notification laws to address child 
pornography offenses flies in the face of conventional wis-
dom. When criminal activity involves markets and 
requires networks and co-conspirators, traditional strategy 
suggests isolating potential offenders from each other. By 
altering the legal and economic environment in ways that 
make communication more difficult and that reduce trust 
and sow discord, the law can raise the costs of group crim-
inality.75 Community notification laws appear to do the 
opposite. Lawmakers, blinded by a particular vision of sex 
offenses and sex offenders, may have forgotten that unlike 
in the rape or child molestation contexts, attacking child 
pornography and its associated abuses requires that child 
pornography possessors, distributors, and producers not 
be able to communicate and conspire. 
Yet conspiracy among sex offenders has always been 
enough of a concern that a number of states have passed 
laws that prohibit offenders from living together,76 despite 
simultaneously implementing community notification 
laws that unwittingly provide them the information neces-
sary to find one another. In the child pornography context, 
the threat of complicity has led the International Centre 
for Missing & Exploited Children to recommend that gov-
ernments make criminal the “[o]ffering [of] information 
on where to find child pornography [or] advice or taking 
actions necessary to facilitate” child pornography 
offenses.77 Even the Justice Department prompts law 
enforcement officials investigating child pornography 
offenses to ask, “Do the offenders network with other 
offenders?”78 Given that “[child pornography] entrepre-
neurs often rake in more money trafficking images than 
they could running drugs or guns,”79 every policy target-
ing child pornography offenders should begin with the 
understanding that disrupting their networks is essential 
to stopping these crimes.
At the very least, lawmakers ought to reconsider their 
categorical approach to the application of post-release laws 
to all sex offenders, and judges ought to be wary of using 
notification as a substitute for longer sentences. That is 
not to say that judges ought to return to longer sentences. 
Instead, child pornography law and law enforcement strat-
egies should focus on isolating released offenders from 
other potential offenders (and perhaps also from potential 
victims, but not from employers, family, and friends) both 
in real life and on the Internet. So long as the Internet 
remains the locus of these crimes, data retention require-
ments, hash value databases, filtering protocols, 
monitoring policies, Internet service provider liability, 
Internet stings, publicizing the existence of such stings, 
and even offering rewards for locating child pornography 
on the Internet all appear to be appealing options.80
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